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ABSTRACT
Data provenance is a valuable tool for detecting and preventing cy-
ber attack, providing insight into the nature of suspicious events.
For example, an administrator can use provenance to identify the
perpetrator of a data leak, track an attacker’s actions following an
intrusion, or even control the flow of outbound data within an or-
ganization. Unfortunately, providing relevant data provenance for
complex, heterogenous software deployments is challenging, re-
quiring both the tedious instrumentation of many application com-
ponents as well as a unified architecture for aggregating informa-
tion between components.
In this work, we present a composition of techniques for bring-
ing affordable and holistic provenance capabilities to complex ap-
plication workflows, with particular consideration for the exemplar
domain of web services. We present DAP, a transparent architec-
ture for capturing detailed data provenance for web service compo-
nents. Our approach leverages a key insight that minimal knowl-
edge of open protocols can be leveraged to extract precise and effi-
cient provenance information by interposing on application compo-
nents’ communications, granting DAP compatibility with existing
web services without requiring instrumentation or developer co-
operation. We show how our system can be used in real time to
monitor system intrusions or detect data exfiltration attacks while
imposing less than 5.1 ms end-to-end overhead on web requests.
Through the introduction of a garbage collection optimization, DAP
is able to monitor system activity without suffering from excessive
storage overhead. DAP thus serves not only as a provenance-aware
web framework, but as a case study in the non-invasive deployment
of provenance capabilities for complex applications workflows.
1. INTRODUCTION
Data provenance describes the history of the execution of com-
puting systems, providing detailed explanations as to how data ob-
jects were created and came to arrive at their present state. Tradi-
tionally, data provenance has been extremely valuable to perform-
ing forensics following an attack [5, 24, 41]. For example, prove-
nance can indicate which hosts, processes, files, and data have been
affected during the attack and cue cleanup and recovery [37]. Addi-
tionally, provenance is of value in virtually any circumstance where
a context-sensitive decision must be made about a piece of data.
Provenance-aware solutions have been proposed for access controls
[31, 32], data leakage [22], malware detection [14], scientific pro-
cessing [3], and distributed computing [18].
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Unfortunately, in many complex applications where data prove-
nance would be of greatest value, there is not a general solution for
provenance deployment. Although a variety of tools to aid in the
design of provenance-aware applications have been proposed [21,
24, 28, 41], modern software is created through the composition of
many software artifacts that were written by different developers.
Provenance-aware operating systems [7, 15, 16, 29, 34, 35] pro-
vide an alternative to ad hoc instrumentation efforts, but are not a
complete solution in practice due to semantic gap problems. For
example, an operator may want to use provenance to ensure PCI
compliance on a credit card database; however, the abstraction level
with which the operator wants to work (i.e., credit card records in
a database) does not match the system level objects over which
provenance is captured (i.e., processes, files, pipes, etc.). This se-
mantic gap also gives rise to the problem of dependency explosion
– in a long-running program, each output must conservatively be
assumed to have derived from all prior inputs [24]. While existing
approaches to application layer provenance may overcome one in-
stance of the dependency explosion problem [24, 25], they are not
a panacea to this semantic gap problem, as they cannot observe the
semantics all components in a complex workflow.
In this work, we introduce a low-cost methodology for retrofitting
application workflows with provenance capabilities through a com-
position of different introspection methods. We present the design
and implementation of a unified provenance-aware architecture that
includes both novel workflow reconstruction techniques as well as
other known approaches to provenance collection. Our exemplar
provenance-aware workflow mechanism, DAP,1 is designed with
consideration for the unique challenges and opportunities presented
by web service environments. DAP is a transparent collection agent
that captures detailed provenance of application workflows without
suffering from the semantic gap problems of system-level collec-
tion. Our approach leverages minimal knowledge about common
workflow structures in order to extract precise and efficient prove-
nance. In particular, DAP leverages the widespread adoption of the
SQL syntax, transparently interposing on database connections to
interpret and extract the provenance of database transactions. DAP
is compatible with a large percentage of existing web services, gen-
erating concise and understandable provenance with little or no sys-
tem modification.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We present the design and implementation of DAP, a mini-
mally invasive, low overhead framework for capturing work-
flow provenance. DAP combines state-of-the-art provenance
1Dapping is a form of fly fishing that causes minimal disturbance
to the water. Likewise, our DAP system is minimally invasive to ap-
plication workflows while extracting precise contextual metadata.
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Figure 1: A provenance graph showing the actions of a potentially
malicious binary that is running with root privileges. Edges en-
code relationships that flow backwards into the history of system
execution, and writing to an object creates a second node with an
incremented version number.
techniques with novel components that aggregate the prove-
nance of application objects. We also address the challeng-
ing problem of integrating provenance from different capture
points under a common namespace.
• We present an extended case study through which we demon-
strate DAP to be an effective means of reasoning about, de-
tecting, and actively preventing Internet-based attacks. In
particular, we demonstrate that our system can be used as
a means of preventing SQL Injection (SQLi)-based data ex-
filtration, one of the most widespread and insidious threats
to the Internet today. We also show how DAP can be used in
concert with other technologies to track system layer attacks
against the web server.
• In evaluation, we show that our implementation imposes just
5.1 ms of overhead on web application requests, and mi-
crobenchmark individual steps in our system to arrive at a
better understanding of this cost. Automatic provenance col-
lection is known to impose excessive storage overheads on
long running systems; however, through applying a garbage
collection optimization, we show that our mechanism can
monitor for active SQLi attempts while maintaining sublin-
ear growth in storage burden.
2. WEB APPLICATION PROVENANCE
Data provenance describes the actions taken on a data object
from genesis onwards, including how it came to exist in its present
state. Provenance can be queried to answer questions such as “What
datasets were used in the creation of this data object?" and “In
what environment was this data object produced?" A standard rep-
resentation for data provenance is a directed acyclic graph which
is specified in the W3C PROV data model [39], which we will use
throughout this work. An example provenance graph plotting the
execution of a potentially malicious binary is shown in Figure 1.
This binary, while running with root privileges, first read several
system files, including /etc/shadow and /etc/rc.local. It
then wrote to those files in an attempt to gain persistent access to
the system. In the graph, edges represent relationships between dif-
ferent system objects. To prevent cycles from forming in the graph,
writing to an object triggers the creation of a new node that repre-
sents a new version of the object.
Web applications present a challenging scenario for provenance
because of their heterogenous nature; web requests traverse the op-
erating system, web server, web application, and database manage-
ment system, each of which maintain their own internal seman-
tics. Consider the representative scenario in Figure 2. There are i
j workers
client 1 client 2 client i
k connections
request
response request
response
request
response
Figure 2: Diagram of a web service architecture. To accurately
track provenance, it is necessary to track individual client requests
from the network, through the server, to the database, and back.
different Internet clients sending requests. Network requests pass
from the the operating system to the web server software, which the
server handles concurrently with j different workers. The workers’
database transactions are then multiplexed between k different con-
nections. Unfortunately, there is not necessarily any equivalence
between the numbers i, j, and k.
To reason about the attack service of a web application it is nec-
essary to understand the actions of each of these components, yet
deploying provenance capabilities in this domain is particularly
challenging due to the complexity of this workflow. Provenance-
aware operating systems such as PASS [30] , LPM [7], and Pro-
Tracer [27] provide a single point of observation for all system
activity, but are not a complete solution due to the semantic gap
that divides the system and application layers. For instance, these
systems would struggle to disambiguate web server requests as au-
tonomous units of work (i.e., dependency explosion [24]), leading
to the false conclusion that each server response was dependent on
all previous client requests. Lee et al.’s LogGC [25] and BEEP [24]
system provide space-efficient forensics for application monitor-
ing, but suffer from the same semantic gap problem as provenance-
aware operating systems due to their reliance on system audit logs.
The remaining alternative to the above approaches is to under-
take a tedious instrumentation effort of the web application. Al-
though provenance libraries exist that simplify the manual instru-
mentation of source code [28], this approach requires additional re-
sources and domain-specific knowledge that is unlikely to be avail-
able to most web developers. Furthermore, instrumentation could
extend past the primary software artifact to its dependencies, in-
cluding the web server, runtime framework, and other third party li-
braries. This solution may even require re-architecting the web ser-
vice use a provenance-aware database management services such
as Trio [38], DBNotes [9], and ORCHESTRA [23]. Due to the
extraordinary capital required by this approach, we conclude that
is not a viable solution to creating provenance-aware web services.
What is needed instead is a means of retrofitting provenance into
existing services with minimal cost to web developers.
3. DESIGN
3.1 Threat Model & Assumptions
The attack surface we consider in this work is that of a typi-
cal web application. By connecting to the application’s external
listening ports the attacker may attempt a variety of misdeeds on
the system. The attacker may attempt to exfiltrate data from the
web application through iterative command injection (e.g., SQLi)
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Figure 3: The provenance graph of a typical web session that we wish to observe with our architecture.
attacks. A successful exfiltration attack will involve repeated com-
mand injections as the attacker attempts to discover the location of
valuable data. The attacker may also attempt to use command in-
jection to inject spurious data into the database for the purposes of
privilege escalation or cross-site scripting. Alternately, the adver-
sary’s target may not be the web application but the system itself.
The attacker may be attacking the web server in order to compro-
mise other services on the host or to move laterally to other hosts
on the network [40].
We make the following assumptions about the security of each
web service component. We conservatively assume that the web
server, web application, and database engine are all subject to com-
promise. These components may begin to lie about their actions
on the system at any time, but we assume that at least one prove-
nance record of the attacker’s access attempt is recorded prior to
compromise. We also assume that the integrity of the host ker-
nel is assured. This condition is made more reasonable through
the deployment of kernel hardening techniques, integrity measure-
ment, and mandatory access control (e.g., SELinux) that protects
the operating system’s trusted computing base. Finally, we assume
that the novel components our system introduces are not subject to
compromise. As we will later show, these mechanisms are small
and simple enough to be subjected to rigorous audit, and can also
be protected through system hardening techniques.
3.2 System Goals
G1 Complete. Our system must offer a complete description
of individual requests as they pass through an application
workflow. The record must remain complete in the presence
of unexpected events triggered by attacker behavior, such as
command injection attacks or binary exploitation. If we elect
to forego provenance capture at a given system component,
the recorded provenance must provide sufficient context to
reconstitute the entire workflow.
G2 Integrated. Our system must combine provenance from dif-
ferent operational layers in a salient manner that provides
a coherent explanation of application activity to the admin-
istrator. Provenance generated by different capture agents
must share a common namespace, and each capture agent
must be able to accurately reference the activities of other
agents.
G3 Minimally Invasive. Provenance, like security, is often per-
ceived as a cost burden. Our system must therefore impose
a bare minimum number of modifications to existing system
components, including the application and backend infras-
tructure (e.g. database engine, web server). Optimally, our
solution would not make any changes to existing software,
instead introducing independent mechanisms so that the sys-
tem would continue to function correctly as software in the
application is periodically upgraded.
G4 Widely Applicable. To further advocate for the deployabil-
ity of provenance-aware applications, our efforts in the de-
velopment of the system should not be limited to the benefit
of a particular application, backend component, or architec-
ture. Instead, our system should be immediately compatible
with a broad number of existing applications.
G5 Defensive Capabilities. While provenance is invaluable to
forensic investigation after an attack has occurred, attacks on
Internet domains are frequent and relentless. Therefore, our
system must be fast enough to provide real-time assistance
to the defense of the host. This includes the ability to detect
and explain attacks as they occur and aid in system recovery
in the event of a successful attack.
3.2.1 Provenance Definition
As provenance is codified in dramatically different ways through-
out the literature, from exhaustive descriptions of system activity
[34] to lightweight proofs of program execution [26], an impor-
tant step in the design of our system is to identify the scope and
granularity of the events we wish to observe. As the ultimate goal
of our system is to observe the attacker described in Section 3.1,
the provenance we collect must exhaustively describe the manner
in which attacker inputs interact with the application workflow. We
illustrate this with a typical web application, where we must be able
to track a client request from receipt on the host, through a specific
worker in the web server, through a database request and response,
until a response is crafted by the web application and returned to
the remote client. We must also be able to differentiate between
different client requests, even if they are performed by the same
worker or re-use the same database connection.
In order to satisfy Goals G3 and G4, our system must avoid mod-
ifying the database management system. As a consequence of this,
we will be unable to know the precise records that are impacted by
a query. Therefore, we must describe SQL objects not at the gran-
ularity of database records, but instead as database columns and ta-
bles, which can be inferred from the query itself. As we will show
in Section 3.6, this coarser granularity is well suited to explain-
ing command injection techniques, which often involve access to
columns that should never be returned to the user.
With this in mind, the goal of DAP is to produce provenance ex-
planations for individual web requests like the one shown in Figure
3. Network activity is tracked at the system granularity, the web
application is tracked at the granularity of individual units of work,
and database objects are tracked as columns and tables. Provenance
captured at different sources will be integrated through their shared
relation to the web application worker during a given unit of work.
3.3 Provenance Capture: Overview
In order to achieve the above goals, what is needed is a com-
prehensive provenance architecture that is able to understand the
semantics of the web server, database, and operating system in
unison. An overview of our solution to this challenge, DAP, is
shown in Figure 4. Provenance-aware components are shaded in
orange. DAP introduces several provenance-aware components, but
requires no modification to the Web Application or Database En-
gine. The provenance-aware components are a small and re-usable
modification to the Web Server to facilitate execution partitioning,
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Figure 4: Overview of the DAP architecture. Provenance-Aware
components are shaded in orange. No changes are required to the
Database Engine or Web Application; instead, provenance is gener-
ated by interposing on the connection between the Web Application
and Database Engine. A small change to the Web Server is required
to facilitate execution partitioning.
a Database Capture Agent that transparently proxies all traffic be-
tween the Web Application and the Database Engine, and a Prove-
nance Recorder that aggregates provenance information between
the different parties. Our system also assumes that system layer
provenance is being collected, which can be obtained through use
of a custom provenance-aware kernel [7, 29, 34, 35] or user-space
system monitor [15, 16].
The workflow for provenance collection is as follows: (1) a re-
mote host makes a request to the Web Application; (2) a small mod-
ification to the Web Server performs execution partitioning [24],
notifying the Provenance Recorder whenever the Web Application
has started a new autonomous unit of work; (3) the Database Cap-
ture Agent proxies and subsequently parses a query issued to the
Database Engine; (4) after measuring the impact of the query by
parsing the Database Engine response, the Database Capture Agent
(5) transmits provenance information to the Provenance Recorder;
(6) as the Web Applications transmits a response to the remote host,
(7) the Web Server notifies the Provenance Recorder that the unit
of work has ended; throughout execution, (0) the provenance-aware
kernel generates provenance for all activities that are not being ex-
plicitly disclosed by the Web Server or Database Capture Agent.
In the remainder of this section, we will describe in greater depth
the operation of the Database Capture Agent as well as introduce a
provenance-based defensive mechanism. The Execution Partition
and Provenance-Aware Kernel components rely on known tech-
niques and are discussed at greater length in Section 4.
3.4 Provenance Capture: Database
A fundamental design consideration in our system was the man-
ner in which DAP would observe communication between the Web
Application and Database Engine. One possibility would be to in-
strument the web service to extract database queries. This would
have made our solution application-specific, violating Goal G4.
Another possibility would be to instrument the database, or to use
an existing provenance-aware database. However, instrumenting
a database engine would also limit our solution to the benefit of
a particular database service, violating Goal G4. In turn, using a
provenance-aware database would require re-architecting the web
function function
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FROM employees WHERE MAX(salary) > 1,000,000”. The leaves
of the tree are color-coded by their provenance extraction deci-
sion condition. Columns in the select expression are noted by a
SQL_READ provenance event. Columns present in other subex-
pressions are noted by a SQL_USED event. Non-persistent entities
such as numbers, and functions are not considered for provenance
extraction.
service, violating Goal G3.
Instead, we chose to implement an explicit TCP proxy that in-
terposes on communications between the application and database.
The only change required by this approach is that either the applica-
tion or the database change the port over which they communicate
with one another, allowing the proxy to interpose. These types of
configuration options are nearly always exposed and easily modi-
fiable in both database and web application software. We rejected
a fully transparent solution that used iptables to capture pack-
ets between the components, as it would substantially increase the
complexity of the capture agent. We also rejected achieving inter-
position by modifying an existing database connection library as
this would limit the applicability of our agent to applications with
that particular dependency, violating Goal G4.
3.4.1 Query Parsing
After proxying the web application’s traffic, we make use of a
query grammar and parser to extract fine-grained provenance in-
formation from database queries. We chose to focus on the SQL
language in this work due to its widespread use. While in reality
SQL comes in many different flavors and varies by database man-
agement system, our needs are foundational enough that the syn-
tactical differences between SQL variants can be largely ignored.
The output of a SQL parser can be visualized as a parse tree, a
simplified example of which is shown in Figure 5. This tree is is
a SELECT statement that contains a FROM clause (required) and
a WHERE clause, which is one of several optional clauses. We
use this example to demonstrate how DAP handles the various data
objects contained in a SQL query:
Data Accessed: We refer to the named objects referenced in the
primary clause of the query as accessed data. These are the objects
that will be returned by the database in its response to the query.
When a query is parsed, DAP generates a SQL_READ provenance
event for each piece of accessed data. The accessed data in Figure
5 are the employee_id, firstname, and lastname columns, and the
employees table.
Data Referenced: Named objects that appear in subsequent clauses
of the query are not explicitly returned by the database, but nonethe-
less inform the response message. Consider again the example
query in Figure 5 – while employee salaries are not returned in the
query, the response implicitly informs the querier of which employ-
ees salaries are greater than $1,000,000. Referenced data therefore
represents a dangerous side channel for information leakage. How-
ever, in some environments it may be unnecessarily conservative to
treat all referenced data as accessed data. To account for this, we
introduce a SQL_USED event to describe referenced data.
Ephemeral Data: Query expressions also include non-persistent
data objects, such as numbers and string literals. In the case of
SELECT statements, ephemeral data can manipulate the records
and values returned by a query, but not the columns accessed and
referenced. We choose to ignore ephemeral data for the case of
provenance extraction.
During parsing, the SQL grammar tracks named and referenced
data via synthesized attributes. The name, and also the prefix if
present, is added to a linked list as the statement is parsed. At the
root of the statement, a function determines the appropriate prefix
for each column given the tables used in the FROM clause.
While we use the SELECT statement in the scenario above, the
same rules can be applied to other statements. SHOW and DE-
SCRIBE statements can be treated the same way as SELECT state-
ments. For expressions that write to the database, we introduce the
provenance event SQL_WASGENERATEBY. This event is used to
describe the column and table references that appear in the primary
clauses of INSERT and UPDATE expressions. This event contains
the same fields as the SQL_READ event, but is handled differently
by the Provenance Recorder. When a SQL_WASGENERATEBY is
received, the Recorder will create a new node for the accessed ob-
ject with an incremented version number. Subsequent SQL_READ
and SQL_USED events will be linked to the newer node in order to
prevent cycles from forming in the graph. While we do not explic-
itly address any other statement types in this work, our rules gener-
alize to any expression that reads from or writes to the database.
3.4.2 Parsing Challenges
When extracting provenance from non-trivial SQL statements,
a variety of challenges arise. We came across a number of such
challenges while designing and implementing DAP. We describe
our solutions to each problem below:
Parsing Challenge #1: Wildcards. Through use of the wildcard
character, SQL statements are able to reference all columns in a
table without explicitly naming them. To address this, we provide
the Provenance Recorder a schema description, which allows it to
translate the wildcard character into the associated columns for the
given table. In our implementation, we obtain the schema through
use of the mysqldump command.
Parsing Challenge #2: Aliases. Any value in a SQL statement can
be aliased to another name. The challenge in resolving aliases is
that an alias may be referenced in one clause of the query, but de-
fined in another. To address this problem, our SQL grammar makes
use of synthesized attributes to track references and definitions of
aliases. At the top level of the parse tree, the list of referenced
aliases are then resolved to their true table and column names. In
effect, this means that DAP unaliases named objects during parsing,
ensuring that the extracted provenance is unobfuscated.
Parsing Challenge #3: Nested Queries. An additional obstacle
we faced in the design of our grammar was that of nested queries.
In SQL, full statements can be indefinitely nested within one an-
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other. For example, “SELECT A FROM (SELECT id AS A FROM
employees)” is a valid statement. Nested queries can be used to fur-
ther obfuscate the true origin of a data object. Our solution to this
is to modify the synthesized attribute routines described above. At
the root of each subquery in the parse tree, objects in the subquery
are unaliased, and the named and referenced objects used by the
subquery are transferred to the parent query. Additionally, the alias
mapping is passed to the parent query. This allows DAP to unnest
queries as the statement is parsed.
3.5 Provenance-Based Security Mechanism
Given the above provenance capture agents, DAP can be used to
thwart SQLi-based data exfiltration attacks in real-time by perform-
ing provenance-based whitelisting of outbound server responses.
We accomplish this through introducing a Network Guard compo-
nent to the DAP architecture as shown in Figure 6. The Network
Guard is another TCP proxy server placed between web server and
the network. It takes no action on incoming traffic, but inspects out-
bound network traffic from the server. When the guard intercepts a
transmission to the remote host, it examines the network context to
identify the process id of the worker thread. It then issues a query
to the Provenance Recorder to obtain the list of data ancestors used
by the worker during the current unit of work.
In order for the Network Guard to prevent exfiltration, we re-
quire a means of encoding developer or administrator intent about
web service workflows. To do so, we introduce a simple policy lan-
guage. The Network Guard accepts a list of policy rules and checks
the list of ancestors against each rule before permitting the message
to be transmitted. Rules take the form:
< RULE, [Tab1.Col1, . . . , Tabn.Coln], SIZE >
RULE can be set toALLOW to whitelist ancestors, orDENY
to blacklist ancestors. A list of SQL objects can then be specified
to match against in the response messages ancestry. We support
lists of objects, rather requiring multiple policy entries for each ob-
ject in the list, because at times the fusion of data objects reaches
a different sensitivity level than the level of each individual object
(e.g., Personally Identifiable Information2). SIZE, expressed in
bytes, approximates the impact of a query. It can be used to limit
the amount of SQL data that should be returned to a client in a
response message, or can be disabled by setting to 0.
3.6 Security Analysis
2 See NIST SP 800-122
Our arguments for the security of DAP are as follows:
Complete (G1). DAP is able to differentiate between individual
web requests through a minimal modification to the Apache 2 server
that performs execution partitioning. Transactions with the database
are observed by DAP’s Database Capture Agent. Because the port
for the database engine is hard-coded into the web application,
there is no other means to reach the database then to go through
the Capture Agent. In the event that the server is compromised,
DAP can continue to track the actions of the attacker on the system
through use of the provenance-aware kernel, whose trusted comput-
ing base can be isolated from the rest of user space using SELinux
enforcement [7].
Integrated (G2). A major challenge in layered provenance sys-
tems is establishing a uniform namespace for objects [2]. In DAP,
we integrate provenance from different capture agents through track-
ing process ids (pid). In our implementation, the web server is
configured to run in pre-fork mode in which all workers receive
a unique pid. When a request is proxied by the Database Cap-
ture Agent, the worker’s pid is recovered through matching the
network context in the sockaddr_un struct against the list of
active tcp sockets returned by netstat. The pid is then embed-
ded in all subsequent provenance events generated by the Database
Capture Agent. To integrate DAP provenance with system-layer
provenance, we introduce a pid_to_provenance syscall that
accepts a pid and returns the universally unique identifier associ-
ated with the provenance of the process’ fork in the kernel. Thus,
all layers share a common language to describe an activity.
Minimally Invasive (G3). DAP works without requiring any
changes to existing web applications. In our implementation, the
web server is minimally modified through the introduction of a new
header file as well as the insertion of 3 lines of code in the existing
source. The database requires no change except to be reconfigured
to listen on another port, which can be done without recompilation.
If the ability to track attacker actions after a server compromise is
desired, a provenance-aware kernel must be installed on the ma-
chine. However, DAP is able to track service layer attacks, such as
command injection, without this capability.
Widely Applicable (G4). We confirmed that our DAP implementa-
tion is compatible with the Apache 2 and Tomcat (via mod_jk) web
frameworks, as well as with the MySQL and PostGreSQL database
engines. DAP’s use of the SQL grammar is simple enough that it
should work with any SQL variant with only minimal modifica-
tion. In Section 7, we discuss whether our approach generalizes to
NoSQL databases.
Defensive Capabilities (G5). The Network Guard component prox-
ies outbound network traffic and searches its provenance for ev-
idence of data exfiltration. An administrator can use this tool to
prevent certain data objects from ever being returned to the client,
or even to terminate connections if a suspicious amount of data is
being transmitted to the client. Moreover, we reduce the attack sur-
face of DAP by isolating the complex parsing procedure from its
parsing responsibilities, making it more difficult to disable.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented DAP for the Linux operating system. We
have tested that our system works with both MySQL and Post-
GreSQL by using their command line clients. In both cases, the
only change required to the database engine was to modify the
port on which they listen for connections. We also confirmed that
DAP worked correctly with a variety of web applications and tools
including MediaWiki3 (PHP-based), UnixODBC4, and a suite of
Tomcat-based applications released with the AMNESIA [19] eval-
uation testbed5.
4.1 Provenance-Enhanced Web Server
We have instrumented the Apache 2 web server (version 2.2.31)
to perform execution partitioning on each TCP socket. The server is
configured to run in pre-forked mode6. Because we did not have ac-
cess to the BEEP tool, we manually instrumented the source code.
To minimize the impact on the rest of the Apache 2 code base, all of
the logic required to report execution partitions to the Provenance
Recorder was included in a single header file. As a result, we in-
serted just 3 lines of code into the existing source files. The changes
were made to server/config.c. The first insertion included
our header file. The second two lines are placed before and af-
ter the call to ap_run_handler in the ap_invoke_handler
function:
/* DAP -- Transmit "Unit Start" Message here! */
char * uuid = dap_unit_start(
r->connection->remote_addr);
/* Handle the request */
result = ap_run_handler(r);
/* DAP -- Transmit "Unit End" Message here! */
dap_unit_end(uuid);
The dap_unit_start function generates a UUID to asso-
ciate with the unit of work, then transmits the UNIT_START mes-
sage to the Provenance Recorder that contains the UUID and the
remote_addr struct. The dap_unit_end function transmits
a UNIT_END message to the Provenance Recorder that contains
the UUID, then frees the UUID character array.
Instrumenting this layer of the Apache 2 stack offers several ad-
vantages. First, it resides beneath the various error and security
filters performed by the server, ensuring that we do not generate
provenance for requests that are later rejected. Second, it resides
above the file-specific handler module, so we are able to instru-
ment both static web pages and dynamic web applications. As a re-
sult, our provenance-enhanced Apache 2 works for various handler
modules, not just HTTP. For instance, when we later recompiled
Apache with the mod_jk module7, we found that our code also
worked on Tomcat applications without any modification.
4.2 Database Capture Agent
Our capture agent is a multithreaded TCP proxy server that lis-
tens on the database engine’s assigned port. Once connected, the
server extracts database queries issued by the web application. It
then passes them through a Bison parser that makes use of a pub-
licly available SQL grammar8. We extended the grammar to aggre-
gate the columns and tables accessed by the query as described in
Section 3.4.1.
When a new connection is proxied, the Capture Agent first re-
covers the process ID (pid) of the sender by matching the network
context in the sockaddr_un struct against the list of active tcp
sockets returned by netstat. After parsing the query, the Cap-
ture Agent inspects the list of database objects accessed. It then
3 Available at https://www.mediawiki.org.
4 Available at http://www.unixodbc.org.
5 Available at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~halfond/testbed.html.
6 See http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/prefork.html.
7 See http://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc.
8 Available at https://github.com/hoterran/sqlparser.
creates a provenance event for each object, which is a tuple of the
form < pid, relationship, column, table >. Relationship is
one of the several relationships specified in Section 3.4, and are also
consistent with the W3C PROV-DM model. Once the new prove-
nance event is created, it is sent to the recorder through a Unix
socket. Rather than design our own protocol, we extend the space-
efficient Hi-Fi protocol [34] to support several new kinds of events.
In order to ensure application stability, the Database Capture
Agent’s parsing functionality is isolated from the TCP proxy server.
The parser is implemented as a separate binary that is invoked by
the proxy using the system syscall. After running the parser, the
proxy checks its exit code status. If the parser exited in a bad state,
indicating a potential attack, the proxy drops the connection and
transmits the input to the Provenance Recorder as an attribute to
be added to the provenance graph. Because the proxy process does
not directly inspect messages from the application, we are confident
that it cannot be disabled by malcrafted inputs.
4.3 Provenance-Aware Kernel
In the event that the Web Server is compromised, the above com-
ponents alone are insufficient to track attacker actions. This is be-
cause the attacker will no longer be limited to the Web Applica-
tion workflow, but will instead be able to take any action on the
system with the privileges of the Web Server. More dangerously,
the attacker may be able to use this foothold to escalate to root
privileges. Notably, all application-based provenance-tracking [24]
suffers from the same limitation of being unable to reliably record
provenance after the point of compromise. To ensure the ability to
track attacker actions after a server exploit, we ran our application
on top of a provenance-aware operating system. We made use of
the Linux Provenance Modules project for our provenance-aware
kernel. We configured LPM to make use of the Hi-Fi module [34],
and deployed the system as described in [7].
4.4 Provenance Recorder
The Provenance Recorder is responsible for aggregating prove-
nance from the different capture agents and representing it in an ef-
ficiently queried in-memory graph. We implemented the Recorder
in C++ using the SNAP graph library. The Recorder listened for
new provenance events over Unix sockets. Different provenance
events are handled as described in Section 3.4; generally speaking,
when the Recorder received a new event it first checked to see if any
of the involved objects were already present in the graph, created
them if they are not, and then added a new relationship between
the objects. Visual examples of how provenance graphs were rep-
resented by the recorder follow in Section 6.
4.5 Network Guard
Like the Database Capture Agent, the Network Guard is a mul-
tithreaded TCP proxy server that is placed between the web server
and the network. When outbound traffic is transmitted from the
web server, the Network Guard issues an ancestry query request to
the Provenance Recorder by using the pid of the sending worker as
a unique identifier. Upon receipt of the list of ancestors, the Net-
work Guard verifies policy compliance prior to permitting the data
to be transmitted over the network.
5. EVALUATION
We evaluated DAP using a VMWare Fusion VM running CentOS
6.5. We executed our webserver tests in the common deployment
model of a virtual machine with 4GB RAM and 2 vCPUs. The
host was a local server with two 2.4 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon
processors and 12 GB RAM.
Scenario Time
Web Application w/o DAP 34.5 ms
Web Application w/ DAP 29.3 ms
Overhead 5.1 ms (17.1%)
Table 1: End-to-end delay imposed by DAP during the DVDStore
Benchmark
Location Operation Time
Apache 2 config.c Transmit unit_start message 0.82 ms
Apache 2 config.c Transmit unit_end message 0.91 ms
Database Capture Agent Parse SQL Query 0.11 ms
Database Capture Agent Transmit SQL Provenance 1.98 ms
Database Capture Agent Other (incl. proxy cost) 1.28 ms
Table 2: Microbenchmarks for DAP system during the DVDStore
benchmark
5.1 End-to-End Delay
One of the vital measures of DAP’s performance is the end to end
delay it imposes on web requests. The apparatus we used for both
this test and its subsequent microbenchmarks was the Dell DVD
Store Database Test Suite,9 an open source simulation of an online
ecommerce site. We configured DVDStore to run on MySQL with
a 10 GB database. DVDStore’s benchmarks are issued directly to
the DBMS, bypassing the web front-end of the ecommerce site;
in order to measure our modifications to Apache 2, we modified
DVDStore’s client workload driver to issue all SQL queries as curl
requests to port 80 of the host. The queries were received by a toy
PHP application on Apache 2 that relayed SQL queries to MySQL
using POST requests, then returned the results to the client. In total,
the DVDStore workload issued over 10,000 unique SQL queries to
our system.
We measured overall performance under two configurations. In
the first (without DAP), an unmodified copy of httpd communicated
directly with MySQL. In the second (with DAP), our modified httpd
communicated through the database capture agent. Table 1 summa-
rizes our findings. The average response time for queries when DAP
was disabled was 29.3 ms. The average response time for queries
when DAP was enabled was 34.5 ms, representing a cost of just 5.1
ms, or 17% overhead.
5.2 Microbenchmarks
During the above trial, we instrumented DAP to measure the
time spent on individual steps involved in provenance capture – the
unit_start and unit_stop messages generated by the web
server, the SQL parsing step, and the transmission of provenance
from the Database Capture Agent to the Provenance Recorder. By
subtracting these measures from an end-to-end measurement, we
also captured the approximate cost of other steps, most notably the
delay imposed by proxying database traffic. The results are shown
in Table 2, and Figure 7 shows the associated cumulative density
functions for each measure. The various SQL queries generated by
DVDStore could be parsed and have their provenance extracted in
an average of 0.11 ms. The primary source of delay in our DAP
system is due to inter-process communication; transmitting small
provenance events to the recorder required approximately 1 ms, and
larger messages required approximately 2 ms. Steps that required
inter-process communication experienced high variance, indicating
processing delays at the Recorder that could be addressed to im-
prove performance. As our provenance recorder implementation
was single-threaded, it is likely that delays could be dramatically
9See http://linux.dell.com/dvdstore/
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Figure 7: Cumulative Densities of each microbenchmark step dur-
ing the DVDStore benchmark.
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Figure 8: Cumulative Density of Provenance Recorder’s response
time when queried by the Network Guard.
reduced through creating a multi-threaded version of the recorder.
5.3 Network Guard Performance
Benchmarking our Network Guard involved determining the speed
with which DAP provenance can be analyzed in a live system. This
was the first evaluation trial in which the Network Guard was en-
abled. We instrumented the Network Guard to measure the time re-
quired to query the Provenance Recorder and process its response
message. For this trial we repeated the DVDStore benchmark,
which included a great diversity of SQL queries. The results are
shown in Figure 8. The average response time by the Provenance
Recorder was just 1.23 ms. We microbenchmarked this result as
well, and found that on average 1.17 ms of this delay was due to
IPC, while just 0.5 ms was required to generate the provenance an-
cestry. In the worst case, the query took 7 ms to respond, but this
was also due to IPC delays and not to the cost of graph traversal.
These results indicate that even our proof-of-concept implementa-
tion can be used as an enforcement mechanism without imposing
unacceptable latency.
5.4 Storage Overhead & Optimization
A vital consideration when collecting data provenance is the stor-
age overhead incurred. Not only do high overheads increase the
cost of storage, but preserving unnecessary provenance impacts the
speed with which the provenance can be queried. To capture the
storage overhead of DAP, we observed the growth of the prove-
nance graph during the DVDStore workload. Every 500 ms, we
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Figure 9: Growth of provenance storage during the DVDStore
benchmark
polled the total size of the provenance recorder’s memory alloca-
tion using the /proc file system. The results of this trial are shown
in Figure 9. During ust the first 6 minutes of the DVDStore trial,
the provenance logs grew to 15.7 MB in size. Unfortunately, for
popular web services like Facebook and Twitter that field billions
of requests per day, this would represent petabytes of provenance,
making DAP too demanding for widespread use.
To address this problem, we consider a garbage collection tech-
nique based on the SQLi defense scenario that was introduced in
Section 3.5. In this circumstance, the vast majority of provenance
will represent benign web requests. As a result, after the request
is whitelisted by the Network Guard mechanism, this information
can be discarded. In turn, those requests that were potentially ma-
licious can be written to secondary storage for forensic analysis.
By applying this technique, only the provenance of active requests
needs be stored in memory. We implemented this garbage collec-
tion procedure in our provenance guard, and then repeated the trial.
Figure 9 shows that, after the optimization, the provenance store
experienced logarithmic, rather than linear, growth. After 6 min-
utes, the provenance logs grew to just 3.9 MB in size, representing
a 75% decrease in storage overhead. While not a total solution to
provenance storage overhead, this result indicates that overheads
can grow manageably with the size of the web service.
6. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we consider several attack scenarios in which
DAP can be used to monitor and prevent Internet-based attacks.
6.1 Scenario #1: SQL Injection
Through the introduction of the Network Guard component, DAP
is able to prevent SQLi-based data exfiltration attacks in real-time
by performing provenance-based whitelisting of outbound server
responses. As shown in Section 5.3, the Network Guard can au-
thorize (or deny) an outbound message in just a few milliseconds.
Here, we procedurally generate the provenance graph of a SQLi at-
tack by using a toy PHP application on Apache 2 that relayed SQL
queries to MySQL over POST requests. One example provenance
ancestry is shown in Figure 10. Here, we see the provenance of
a message derived from SQL data from the customers and orders
tables. Any number of the ancestral objects may be an indicator of
a data leak. For example, it is unlikely that the web service would
explicitly return passwords to the customer. Additionally, a web
service would not return a full credit card number to the customer.
Interestingly, the query obfuscations that are commonly associ-
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Figure 10: The provenance of a successful SQL injection attack on an eCommerce site launched by remote host X.X.X.X. The attack
exfiltrates several valuable data objects from the customers and orders tables.
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Figure 11: The provenance of an ImageTragick exploit. Network
activity has been pruned for clarity. The attacker uploads a mali-
cious image file rsh.jpg that opens a remote shell back to the
attackers host. The attacker gains persistence on the machine by
placing a reverse shell script in the htdocs folder of the server.
ated with SQLi are not present in the provenance graph. This is be-
cause such obfuscations are designed to bypass input sanitization
checks that are performed by the web application. When a mali-
cious input is able to successfully pass through these checks, the
output is a well-formed SQL query. As a result, DAP is optimally
positioned to understand the intent of the attacker.
6.2 Scenario #2: ImageTragick Exploit
To demonstrate the combined capabilities of DAP and LPM when
deployed in tandem, we developed a web application exploit based
on the recently discovered vulnerabilities in the ImageMagick im-
age processing library.10 Our vulnerable web application made use
of a PHP script that used the ImageMagick library to test whether
an uploaded file was an image. The attack payload was a jpg com-
prised of 4 lines of text including the following command:
image over 0,0 0,0
’https://127.0.0.1/x.php?x=‘bash -i >&
/dev/tcp/X.X.X.X/9999 0>&1‘’
This code is executed by the server when the image is processed
by the ‘identify‘ ImageMagick tool, causing a bash shell to be
10See https://imagetragick.com/
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Figure 12: The union of DAP and systems layer provenance can
track a remote shell invocation launched by remote host X.X.X.X.
The provenance of file and packet manipulations have been pruned
for clarity. DAP assists the forensic process by identifying the re-
mote host and unit of work responsible for the exploit.
linked to the attackers remote host on port 9999. The provenance
of these activities on the server side is shown in Figure 11. With-
out DAP, the operating system provenance for these events would
be difficult to interpret. Dependency explosion would make it hard
to identify which remote host was able to invoke a shell command.
DAP signals the start of a unit of work before the request is handled,
which removes from suspicion all sessions that occurred prior to
the compromise. Following the compromise, LPM can be securely
configured such that the attackers actions on the system can con-
tinue to be monitored [7].
6.3 Scenario #3: Reverse Shell Invocation
As a final example, we monitor the attacker’s subsequent visits
to the web server through invoking the reverse-shell.php
script. To create realistic attack provenance, we made use of a pub-
licly available php-reverse-shell application.11 Reverse shells were
also an aspect of the Apache 2 Darkleech attack [1]. Figure 12
shows the resulting provenance graph. Here, we can see that an
httpd worker with pid 37092 is handling a request from remote
host X.X.X.X. Unexpectedly, the worker issues a serious of con-
spicuous system commands that collect information regarding the
name of the machine (uname), the identity of the active user (id)
which in this case is daemon, and the activities of other users that
are currently logged in (w). The worker then drops to shell. This
information would serve as an invaluable explanation as to the at-
tackers intent once their intrusion had been discovered.
11Available at http://pentestmonkey.net/tools/web-shells/
php-reverse-shell.
7. DISCUSSION
Is DAP a taint tracking system?
Data provenance and taint analysis are two means of reason-
ing about information flow. While use of these techniques varies
throughout the literature, one means of differentiating between the
two is that taint analysis generally provides what-provenance, but
not how-provenance. In a taint analysis solution for SQL Injection,
a bit might be flipped in the taint label when a packet contained
data from a particular table or column. While this would be suffi-
cient to block the transmission of this packet, it would not provide
forensic information about the attack. By providing both what- and
how- provenance, our approach offers a concise explanation of the
attack, including identifying the perpetrator.
Does DAP track individual record accesses and updates?
The finest granularity that our approach can offer is the granu-
larity of columns; it cannot speak to the specific records that were
impacted by a query. This limitation is comparable to the manner
in which provenance and audit services track file manipulations at
the system call layer; for instance, although the event of a process
writing to a file is tracked, the log will not state what was written,
or which lines of the file were changed. This choice of granularity
represents a design tradeoff between performance and expressivity,
and in the design of DAP we have elected to follow convention. We
show in Section 3.6 that this granularity can be effective at tracking
attacks on web services. Moreover, in order to provide an efficient
and rough estimation the impact of a query, we inspect the database
engine’s response to the query and measure either its size (in the
case of a SELECT) or the number of records affected (in the case
of INSERTs and UPDATEs).
What about NoSQL databases?
Alternatives to tabular relational databases, including Accumulo,
MongoDB, and Cassandra, have become increasingly popular due
to their scalability and high performance. While our design focuses
on relational databases, we feel that our approach is general enough
to apply to these emergent technologies. Rather than extract table
column names from queries, DAP for Key-Value stores would in-
stead focus on extracting Key names from queries. It is also worth
noting that, in many cases, these systems already provide SQL-like
query support.
8. RELATEDWORK
Our work is part of a growing body of literature that explores the
use of provenance to address critical security challenges. Prove-
nance has been employed to detect compromised nodes in data cen-
ters [5, 14, 37, 41], explain and prevent data exfiltration [7, 22], and
enrich access controls [6, 32].
The notion of provenance tracking originated in literature from
the database and scientific workflow communities. Systems such
as Chimera offer management of manual provenance annotations
[13], but does not perform automatic collection. The Kepler system
offers automatic provenance recording for scientific workflows [3],
while VisTrails tracks provenance of data visualization procedures
[8]. Database management systems such as Trio [38], DBNotes
[9], and ORCHESTRA [23] track the provenance of data records
as they propagate through the database, and provide custom exten-
sions to SQL so that provenance can be queried. To reduce reliance
on custom database engines, the PERM [17] and GProM [4] sys-
tems perform automatic query rewriting to annotate result tuples
with provenance information.
In spite of the advances made in provenance-aware workflow en-
gines, the systems are “blind” to the rest of the system. They can-
not observe information flows beyond the boundaries of their own
operation; critically, this means that they cannot make assertions
about whether a given system object (e.g., network packet) was de-
rived from a particular database record. This leaves them of little
use when considering the SQL injection and data exfiltration sce-
narios that motivate our work. In contrast, our system assumes a
“black box" database engine, and observes SQL queries and results
in order to provide efficient linkability between database operations
and other system activity.
8.1 Taint Analysis
Like provenance, dynamic taint analysis tracks the propagation
of data across a system. Automated instrumentation for taint track-
ing has been developed for x86 binaries [36], smartphones [11],
and databases [20], and dynamic taint analysis in sandbox environ-
ments has also been used to secure off-the-shelf applications [42].
Taint tracking systems also suffer from the dependency explosion
problem, an effect that can be mitigated, in part, by focusing on
short-lived user-facing applications like editors [12]. Provenance
can offer a more complete explanation as to how an object became
tainted. It is also more flexible: taint tracking relies on an im-
mutable policy that requires that data be tagged at runtime, while
a provenance-based approach can obtain a result after execution by
“replaying” the provenance graph [41], permitting different taints
to be considered without re-executing.
8.2 Foundational Work
The Nemesis system [10] uses dynamic information flow track-
ing to prevent authentication bypass attacks. Their system requires
manual annotation of the authentication table in the database and
then performs taint analysis to track its use in the web applica-
tion. In contrast, our system can prevent mis-use and exfiltration
of any table in the database and does not require web application
annotation. Parno et al. built CLAMP [33] to prevent exfiltration
from typical web application servers. CLAMP implicitly provides
execution partitioning because they create an individual VM for
each user’s session. They also provide a database proxy, called
the Query Restrictor, which filters queries to the database based
on policy. In DAP, we collect the provenance of database accesses
at the same location, but deploy policy enforcement in a network
guard after the web application has processed the request. This
allows us to specify high-level policies that can potentially span
multiple database accesses rather than needing to specify policy
query by query. Furthermore, we also capture the provenance of
the database response, which allows us to enforce policy on the
number of records returned.
9. CONCLUSION
In spite of a pressing need for ways to explain and mitigate web
application vulnerabilities, web services have received little atten-
tion as candidates for provenance capabilities. In this work, we pre-
sented DAP, a system for creating provenance-aware web applica-
tions. Our system can be deployed without requiring any changes to
the web application, yet provides rich, concise provenance graphs
for web service workflows. We demonstrated DAP’s ability to ex-
plain, detect, and prevent SQL injection attacks, and to aid in the
tracking of system layer attacks against the web server. In evalua-
tion, we discovered that our system imposes just 5.1 ms overhead
on web requests, and introduced a optimization that dramatically
reduces the storage burden of provenance capture. Thus, DAP’s
non-invasive methodology demonstrates a deployment strategy for
provenance not only in web services, but for all complex, hetero-
geneous application workflows.
Availability
Our source code and testing framework will be released upon pub-
lication.
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